The whole world heard about the accident, and all Americans were very sad about the deaths of their astronauts. Even the Soviet Union, America's competitor in the space race, told the American government how sorry they were to hear about the fire.
The Apollo program itself was stopped for almost two years while engineers made changes to the Apollo spacecraft to make it safer. Today, there are a lot of schools, civic buildings, and other places named for Grissom, White, and Chaffee. Several memorials were built to honor their loss in the fire. But maybe the biggest legacy, or way they have been remembered, of their deaths is the change that happened in the space program: since the Apollo 1 fire, there has never been another fire in an American spacecraft — engineers learned that very painful lesson during the fire in Apollo 1 and have done everything they can to make sure another fire can never happen.
Official portrait of prime and backup crews for AS, as of April 1, The Apollo 1 crew expressed their concerns about their spacecraft's problems by presenting this parody of their crew portrait to ASPO manager Joseph Shea on August 19, Chaffee, White, and Grissom training in a simulator of their command module cabin, January 19, Apollo 1 crewmen enter their spacecraft in the altitude chamber at Kennedy Space Center, October 18, Apollo 1 facts for kids Kids Encyclopedia Facts.
Quick facts for kids Apollo 1 Grissom, White, and Chaffee in front of the launch pad containing their AS space vehicle. Virgil I. Apollo program. Main page: Apollo program. All content from Kiddle encyclopedia articles including the article images and facts can be freely used under Attribution-ShareAlike license, unless stated otherwise. Cite this article:. This page was last modified on 20 September , at Suggest an edit. Grissom, White, and Chaffee in front of the launch pad containing their AS space vehicle.
Now the Apollo missions would take astronauts all the way to the moon for orbital missions and landing missions. The first manned mission — an Earth-orbiting mission — was originally designated Apollo Saturn, or AS, but was later renamed Apollo 1. The Apollo 1 fire was a difficult time for NASA and its astronauts, but the improvements in astronaut safety allowed the agency to complete the rest of the program with no further fatalities.
The agency also met Kennedy's goal of landing a man on the moon in , during Apollo NASA had a special ceremony honoring the Apollo 1 astronauts on the 50th anniversary of their deaths in , which included unveiling a new exhibit at the Kennedy Space Center showing the hatches of the damaged command module.
Grissom was America's second person in space in On that mission, Mercury's Liberty Bell 7, the hatch door blew for unknown reasons upon splashdown. Grissom ended up in the water and was rescued by a helicopter which at first tried, in vain, to pick up the spacecraft; the spacecraft was later pulled from the ocean floor in Some in the Astronaut Office were skeptical that Grissom's reputation would recover many believed Grissom blew the hatch; he swore he didn't.
However, Grissom successfully commanded the first Gemini flight, Gemini 3, and was selected to do the same for Apollo. Fellow spaceflight veteran Ed White , an Air Force lieutenant colonel, was the first American to make a spacewalk, on Gemini 4 in The images of him soaring in space for 23 minutes are still frequently seen today; it is considered one of history's most memorable spacewalks.
Roger Chaffee was a seasoned Navy lieutenant commander who joined the program in Although a rookie in space, he had spent years supporting the Gemini program, most publicly as CapCom on Gemini 4. Now getting a chance to fly after five years in the program, he said, "I think it will be a lot of fun. Every astronaut in the Apollo program had flight experience, and many were test pilots.
They were used to seeing machines under development and dealing with delays, and assessing the airplanes' readiness for flight. In the view of many of these astronauts, the Apollo command module just wasn't ready yet. Engineering changes were still in progress as NASA prepared for the countdown test. On his last visit home in Texas, Jan.
The test was initiated at GMT on 27 January After initial system tests were completed, the flight crew entered the command module at GMT. The command pilot noted an odor in the spacecraft environmental control system suit oxygen loop and the count was held at GMT while a sample of the oxygen in this system was taken. The count was resumed at GMT with hatch installation and subsequent cabin purge with oxygen beginning at GMT.
The odor was later determined not to be related to the fire. Communication difficulties were encountered and the count was held at approximately GMT to troubleshoot the problem. The problem consisted of a continuously live microphone that could not be turned off by the crew.
Various final countdown functions were still performed during the hold as communications permitted. By GMT , all final countdown functions up to the transfer to simulated fuel cell power were completed and the count was held at T minutes pending resolution of the communications problems. From the start of the T minute hold at GMT until about GMT , there were no events that appeared to be related to the fire.
The major activity during this period was routine troubleshooting of the communications problem; all other systems were operating normally.
There were no voice transmissions from the spacecraft from GMT until the transmission reporting the fire, which began at During the period beginning about 30 seconds before the report, there were indications of crew movement. There was no evidence as to what this movement was or that it was related to the fire. The biomedical data indicated that just prior to the fire report the senior pilot was performing essentially no activity until about GMT , when a slight increase in pulse and respiratory rate was noted.
At GMT , the electrocardiogram indicated some muscular activity for several seconds. Similar indications were noted at GMT. The data showed increased activity but were not indicative of an alarm type of response. The noises were similar to those transmitted earlier in the test by the live microphone when the command pilot was known to have been moving.
These sounds ended at Any significant crew movement resulted in minor motion of the command module and was detected by the guidance and navigation system. The type of movement, however, could not be determined. More movement began at GMT and continued until loss of data transmission during the fire. Increases of oxygen flow rate to the crew suits also indicated movement.
All suits had some small leakage, and this leakage rate varied with the position of each crew member in the spacecraft. Earlier in the Plugs Out Integrated Test, the crew reported that a particular movement, the nature of which was unspecified, provided increased flow rate. This was also confirmed from the flow rate data records. At The records showed a surge in the AC Bus 2 voltage. Several other parameters being measured also showed anomalous behavior at this time. Beginning at Emergency procedures called for the senior pilot, occupying the center couch, to unlatch and remove the hatch while retaining his harness buckled.
A number of witnesses who observed the television picture of the command module hatch window discerned motion that suggested that the senior pilot was reaching for the inner hatch handle. Data from the Guidance and Navigation System indicated considerable activity within the command module after the fire was discovered. This activity was consistent with movement of the crew prompted by proximity of the fire or with the undertaking of standard emergency egress procedures. Personnel located on adjustable level 8 adjacent to the command module responded to the report of the fire.
The pad leader ordered the implementation of crew egress procedures and technicians rushed toward the White Room which surrounded the hatch and into which the crew would step upon egress. Then, at GMT , the command module ruptured. All transmission of voice and data from the spacecraft terminated by Witnesses monitoring the television showing the hatch window reported that flames spread from the left to the right side of the command module and shortly thereafter covered the entire visible area.
Flames and gases flowed rapidly out of the ruptured area, spreading flames into the space between the command module pressure vessel and heat shield through access hatches and into levels A-8 and A-7 of the service structure. These flames ignited combustibles, endangered pad personnel, and impeded rescue efforts.
The burst of fire, together with the sounds of rupture, caused several pad personnel to believe that the command module had exploded or was about to explode. The immediate reaction of all personnel on level A-8 was to evacuate the level. This reaction was promptly followed by a return to effect rescue. Upon running onto the swing arm from the umbilical tower, several personnel obtained fire extinguishers and returned along the swing arm to the White Room to begin rescue efforts.
Others obtained fire extinguishers from various areas of the service structure and rendered assistance in fighting the fires. Three hatches were installed on the command module. The outermost hatch, called the boost protective cover BPC hatch, was part of the cover which shielded the command module during launch and was jettisoned prior to orbital operation. The middle hatch was termed the ablative hatch and became the outer hatch when the BPC was jettisoned after launch.
The inner hatch closed the pressure vessel wall of the command module and was the first hatch to be opened by the crew in an unaided crew egress. On the day of the fire, the outer or BPC hatch was in place but not fully latched because of distortion in the BPC caused by wire bundles temporarily installed for the test.
The middle hatch and inner hatch were in place and latched after crew ingress. Although the BPC hatch was not fully latched, it was necessary to insert a specially-designed tool into the hatch in order to provide a hand-hold for lifting it from the command module.
By this time the White Room was filling with dense, dark smoke from the command module interior and from secondary fires throughout level A While some personnel were able to locate and don operable gas masks, others were not. Some proceeded without masks while others attempted without success to render masks operable.
Even operable masks were unable to cope with the dense smoke present because they were designed for use in toxic rather than dense smoke atmospheres. Visibility in the White Room was virtually nonexistent. It was necessary to work essentially by touch since visual observation was limited to a few inches at best.
A hatch removal tool was in the White Room. Once the small fire near the BPC hatch had been extinguished and the tool located, the pad leader and an assistant removed the BPC hatch. Although the hatch was not latched, removal was difficult. They left the White Room and passed the tool required to open each hatch to other individuals. A total of five individuals took part in opening the three hatches. Each were forced to make several trips to and from the White Room in order to reach breathable air.
The middle hatch was removed with less effort than was required for the BPC hatch. The inner hatch was unlatched and an attempt was made to raise it from its support and to lower it to the command module floor. The hatch could not be lowered the full distance to the floor and was instead pushed to one side. When the inner hatch was opened, intense heat and a considerable amount of smoke issued from the interior of the command module.
When the pad leader ascertained that all hatches were open, he left the White Room, proceeded a few feet along the swing arm, donned his headset and reported this fact. From a voice tape it has been determined that this report came approximately 5 minutes 27 seconds after the first report of the fire.
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